Cinque Impatti Ambientali di Ampia Portata del Conflitto Attuale in Ucraina. – Nel 2013, il presidente ucraino Viktor Yanukovych tentò di rafforzare i legami con la Russia, provocando proteste che sfociarono nel conflitto nell’Ucraina orientale e nell’annessione della Crimea da parte della Russia. Nel febbraio 2022, la Russia ha avviato un’invasione su larga scala, scatenando una guerra totale. Questo documento si propone di valutare i cinque effetti più devastanti che il conflitto tra Russia e Ucraina ha sull’ambiente, con particolare attenzione alle conseguenze su ecosistemi e biodiversità, risorse idriche, qualità dell’aria, infrastrutture, e ai rischi radiologici e nucleari. La ricerca utilizza un approccio misto, basato principalmente su analisi qualitative e comparative, con l’integrazione occasionale di analisi geospaziali. I primi risultati indicano un grave degrado ambientale, legato all’inquinamento causato dalle attività militari e ai danni alle infrastrutture. In conclusione, si sottolinea l’urgenza di affrontare le conseguenze ambientali del conflitto per promuovere la sostenibilità nelle aree colpite.

Vladimir Putin’s territorial trap: what the invasion of Ukraine reveals about the contemporary war-sovereignty nexus. – The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is a clear demonstration of how the conduct of a war can highlight what purpose the war is supposed to serve. In this article, President Vladimir Putin’s putative objectives in the Ukraine war are connected to the war-sovereignty nexus through the concept of geopolitical order, arguing that war fulfills different objectives under different geopolitical conditions because different combinations of sovereignty regimes are operative under different geopolitical orders. Attention then turns to the discourse of sovereignty adopted by Putin and how it reflects a certain set of contradictory understandings about sovereignty implicit in the conduct of the war.

NextGenerationEU between pandemic, war, and energy transition. – The energy transition has been strongly questioned by the pandemic and the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The European Green Deal – designed and approved before the Covid-19 pandemic – became fully part of economic recovery program of the pandemic, and the war as well. Actually, the Green Deal becomes one of the fundamental pillars of the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Plan, as well as of NextGenerationEU and, consequently, of the various national plans related to it, including the Italian PNRR. As a typical win-win policy, NextGenerationEU must solve the problems related to the economic crisis, and those related to environmental quality, through the energy transition, as well. Obviously, the economic recover does not necessarily fit perfectly into an energy transition program. Actually, the policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions might imply many issues, related to economy and labor policies. Added to this are the socio-economic gaps between the countries that make up the EU, which have produced an energy divide (different levels of energy demand, different efficiency, different composition of primary energy sources), which has also further increased. from the pandemic, which requires a “calibrated” approach. This condition produces a more complex energy transition, and in many countries - especially those with the lowest GDP per capita - it could create obstacles to economic recovery. Although a Just Transition Mechanism has been prepared, precisely to bridge these gaps, the energy transition could be perceived as an external interference and a brake on growth, becoming a lever for forms of nationalism and sovereignty in key anti-European. The proposed work - after analyzing the structure of the energy supply in the EU, highlighting the inconsistencies in it - will address the impact of the Green Deal in the energy transition process associated with the relaunch of the economy.

Armed secessionism in the post-soviet space. The case of South Ossetia. – During the 1990s, several new independent States arose from the collapse of the Soviet Union were involved in ethnic conflicts that led to the secession of parts of their territory and to the self-proclamation of de facto republics supported militarily and diplomatically by Russia but lacking international recognition. The explosion and the lack of resolution of these conflicts can be linked to the Russian aim to exert a hegemonic influence on the former Soviet republics that pursue a pro-Western stance. This is the case of the “five days” war of August 2008, which saw Georgia and Russia fighting for the self-proclaimed republic of South Ossetia, territory formally belonging to Georgia but outside its control. Here we want to retrace origins and repercussions of this conflict, also in light of the Georgian position regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

The use of force in interstate relations: theory and evolutions in geo-political practice. – The use of force in relations between states and other players on the world stage: theory, practice and developments in political geography. Based on the experiences of the twentieth century (world wars, genocides, ideological-totalitarian degenerations, decolonization processes), the geopolitical thought of late modernity, starting from the 1960s, essentially develops in a “critical” sense. Then it assumes, among its favorite themes, the discussion on the essence of power (whether or not it is intrinsically “bad”), of the state and of politics (if they inevitably have to rely on the use of force); then it starts the development of a method targeted to regulation and prevention of conflicts, based on a process of deconstruction of alleged “false” ideas of power, to prevent the effects of escalation that have led the whole of humanity to the risk of destruction and self-destruction. These needs are translated operationally into the search for the so-called “insider” factors, that is, those that, in a certain scenario, beyond an immanent and self-evident “casus belli”, cause effects of permanent and out of control conflict, to the point of making war an element that justifies itself (an end, rather than a means). Effects that confuse any causal chain, which make it difficult to identify links and motivations, and therefore the search for a solution, and with it the pacification of crisis scenarios (which in fact tend to perpetuate themselves in areas of “endemic” conflictuality. All this proceeding on the basis of a neo-Enlightenment (possibly neo-liberal) assumption, which almost deterministically assumes the affirmation of an open society, refractory to violence, and the assimilation of “evil” to the mechanisms of democratization, to open market and capitalist prosperity. All this in a context of multilateral policy development, the establishment of international organizations, and the consolidation of a trans-national geo-economic apparatus, of civil society as an “answer to war”, with the aim of progressively limiting, up to cancel the same occasions of conflict; and this to the point that an idea of war as something obsolete spreads (perhaps in an illusory way). The latest events, however, and recent developments, seem to contradict this trend, re-proposing themes and tensions that ge-ographic-political theory seemed to have abandoned for some time. A fact made even more evident by the current invasion of Ukraine, which leaves you dismayed, like aggression to troglodytic times, when the invasion did not need to have a justification; it seems to cause deliberate violence and destruction on a large scale, so much so as to question the entire “critical” paradigm. Putin 24th February discourse deliberately denies the right of Ukraine to survive as a national human community. Evolutions that make it necessary to rethink the practices of limitation and regulation, of the intervention and prevention devices of war, and of the same method of study of the scenarios; perhaps a return to models that, just until a few months ago, were considered outdated.

Bosnia and Herzegovina in front of an European war resurgence: violence does not stop, yet the word “war” does not exist anymore. – The end of the Cold war did not determine “the end of history”, nor it started a new era of world peace under the sign of political and economic liberalism, globally recognized values. On the contrary, starting with the early ‘90s there were wars even within Europe’s core that caused hundreds of thousands of victims and millions of refugees. Yet the word “war” is cancelled from the dictionary: nowadays conflicts are called “humanitarian bombings”, “peace missions”, or in the case of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, “a special military operation”. After the 1992-1995 Bosnian conflict, the institutional asset imposed through Dayton peace did not satisfy the Country’s national élite’s expectations. So much that, in a context of poverty and unemployment where the nationalists of the Republic of Srpska – which stretches on 49% of the BiH territory – call for independence from Sarajevo in their programs through a unilateral rescission of the constitutional pact formed in Dayton, since 2021 there has been significant risk increase, both perceived and objectively measurable, of a new Balkan war, emphasized by the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Within this scenery of great insecurity for the Bosnian population it becomes clear that a rapid integration of the Western Balkans – the anti-historical residual black hole in the continent – into the EU is necessary.